Volume 6, Spring 2026, Issue 1
FOR WANT OF A VOTE: FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND WHAT THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (ALMOST) LOOKED LIKE
Article
Mark Gibney
Nearly a quarter century ago in the case of Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom (2001), the European Court of Human Rights ruled by the narrowest of margins (9-8) that the UK’s foreign sovereign immunity statute did not violate the European Convention. Because of this law, Sulaiman Al-Adsani, a dual British-Kuwaiti national, was denied the opportunity to bring a suit against a state whose agents had allegedly tortured him. International human rights law promises victims some form of effective remedy, yet nearly all victims are denied this, leading to a form of double victimization. One reason for this result is the adherence to the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity, which protects states from being sued in the domestic courts of some other country, at least with regard to governmental, as opposed to commercial, activities. Because of this, even states that violate jus cogens norms such as the prohibition against torture cannot be sued by victims of this abuse in some other state. Al-Adsani nearly overturned this doctrine, at least with respect to the parties to the European Convention. In the words of one of the dissenting judges, the Court thereby missed a “very good opportunity to deliver a courageous judgment.”
Yet, some recent events indicate that international human rights law might be in the process of changing. As shown in such cases as Gambia v. Myanmar (2019) and South Africa v. Israel (2023) under the Genocide Convention, and Canada and the Netherlands v. Syria (2023) under the Torture Convention, this “opportunity” is upon us, as different states have started to recognize that their obligations under international human rights law are not confined to their own national border.
STEERING CLEAR OF MANDATE CREEP AND MANDATE SLEEP: THE INTERPRETATION OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS ESTABLISHING AND MANDATING HUMAN RIGHTS INVESTIGATIVE BODIES
Article
Jan Arno Hessbruegge
The Human Rights Council and other United Nations organs and subsidiary organs regularly establish commissions of inquiry, fact-finding missions, and similar bodies to conduct in-depth investigations of human rights concerns. This article reviews the mandates, terms of reference and public reports of more than eighty such human rights investigative bodies established by the United Nations between 1963 and 2025. On this basis, it seeks to distill the principles guiding the interpretation of human rights investigative mandates and provides a systematized account of how United Nations human rights investigative bodies have applied them. The basic methodology for interpreting instruments of secondary international law entails examining the ordinary meaning of their terms, their underlying object and purpose, and their systemic integration within the broader system of other international law and, to a lesser extent, the history of their negotiation and subsequent practice. These interpretive methods will provide investigative bodies with a solid initial understanding of their mandate. Yet, mandate interpretation is even more profoundly shaped by a further layer of seven principles that stem from the inherent values of United Nations human rights fact-finding, as conceived by the General Assembly. According to these principles, investigative mandates must be interpreted in an even-handed, protection-minded, victim-centered, gender-sensitive, dynamic, holistic, and accountability-focused manner. Investigative bodies have been applying these principles as correctives where their mandates, which emanate from political processes, seem imbalanced, do not address the most serious concerns, do not anticipate changes on the ground, or confine an investigation to overly narrow issues without regard to their broader context, causes, and consequences. Rigorous application of these interpretive principles will ensure that gender issues and the concerns of the most vulnerable victims such as displaced and older persons, persons with disabilities, and children are duly considered. The article concludes that human rights investigative bodies should be consistently clear and transparent on how they interpret their mandates to further enhance their legitimacy and understanding of their work among stakeholders.
THE ARTEMIS ACCORDS AND THE SHARING OF LUNAR RESOURCES: A COMPARISON OF INTERNATIONALLY SHARED RESOURCES
Student Note
Parker Lewin
The Artemis Accords, adopted in October 2020, mark a significant development in international space law. By November 15, 2024, fifty-six countries had signed the non-binding agreement, signaling broad interest in cooperating to establish a sustained presence on the Moon. This article examines the Accords’ role in shaping modern space governance and argues that future, legally binding international agreements will be necessary to ensure the fair and equitable use of lunar resources. Drawing on existing legal regimes governing shared global resources, it compares Earth-based models to the emerging framework for lunar activities. In doing so, this article highlights how the Artemis Accords may influence the future of space exploration and international cooperation.
LITHIUM MINING IN CHILE, ARGENTINA, AND BOLIVIA: THE INDIGENOUS FIGHT FOR WATER RIGHTS
Student Note
Amber Soffer
This note examines the impact of lithium mining in Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia on Indigenous rights by using the international right to water as a framework for discussion. The analysis begins with an overview of lithium mining and water use. Next, the “lithium triangle” is introduced, and the discussion describes essential actors, governance structures, and impacts on the Indigenous communities. It then analyzes relevant international law to highlight the right to water and its connection to Indigenous rights to create a framework that supports the Indigenous right to water. In the broader scope, this note illustrates how Indigenous communities can harness international law to defend their human rights against those who attempt to exploit their lands and resources.
ESSEQUIBO AND THE EROSION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CALL FOR LEGAL AND DIPLOMATIC RESOLVE
Student Note
Jamicka Rutherford
As of 2025, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has not yet issued a final ruling in the longstanding territorial dispute between Guyana and Venezuela over the Essequibo region. Although the 1899 Arbitral Award granted the region to Guyana and has never been legally overturned, Venezuela has continued to reject the decision, particularly considering recent oil discoveries. If the international community continues to treat this issue as a matter of legal affirmation without requiring enforcement, Guyana’s sovereignty—and the credibility of international law—remains at risk. This note advocates for the ICJ to reaffirm the 1899 Arbitral Award and, crucially, for the international community to take proactive diplomatic and security-based steps to ensure Venezuela’s compliance. It addresses Venezuela’s reliance on legally invalid claims, including the Treaty of Tordesillas and posthumous allegations of arbitral misconduct, while also highlighting Venezuela’s defiance through military incursions, symbolic renaming, and cartographic manipulation. Drawing on comparative international cases including Nicaragua v. United States and the South China Sea Arbitration, this note argues that legal rulings without enforcement mechanisms often embolden powerful states to disregard international law. The Cameroon–Nigeria Border Dispute demonstrates, however, that through multilateral oversight and diplomatic cooperation, international law can effectively affirm sovereignty, offering a constructive model for the Guyana–Venezuela controversy. With the ICJ’s ruling expected in 2026, waiting is no longer an option. The time to secure Guyana’s territorial integrity and reaffirm global respect for the rule of law is now.